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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, : BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : 
v. : 
GUIDO JOHN ALVILLAR, : Case No. 950422-CA 
Defendant/Appellant. : Priority No. 2 
JURISDICTION 
Defendant/Appellant Guido John Alvillar appeals from his Salt Lake 
County District Court conviction of Burglary, a second degree felony, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-202 (1953 as amended), and Theft, a 
second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404 (1953 as 
amended). This Court has jurisdiction over Mr. Alvillar's appeal pursuant to 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(f) (Supp. 94). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE PRESENTED 
Did trial counsel provide ineffective assistance of counsel in violation of 
the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, § 12 of 
the Utah Constitution when she elicited testimony informing jurors that Mr. 
Alvillar had a felony conviction, was on parole and had escaped recently from 
a halfway house? 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES AND RULES 
The United States Constitution provided in pertinent part that "In all 
criminal prosecutions, the accused shall... have the assistance of counsel for his 
defense." U.S. Const., Am. VI. 
The Utah Constitution states in relevant part that "In criminal 
prosecutions the accused shall have the right to appear and defend in person 
and by counsel." Utah Const., Art. I, § 12. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant/Appellant Guido John Alvillar was charged by Information 
filed in Salt Lake County in August 1994 with Burglary, a second degree felony, 
in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-202 (1953 as amended), and Theft, a 
second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404 (1953 as 
amended). By Amended Information filed in December 1994, Mr. Alvillar was 
charged with Theft by Receiving Stolen Property, a second degree felony, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-408 (1953 as amended), as an alternative 
to the Theft charge, and with False Identity to a Peace Officer, a Class C 
misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-507 (1953 as amended).1 
1
 The False Identity charge was severed from the Burglary and Theft counts and 
was later dismissed. 
The charges against Mr. Alvillar were based on the August 2, 1994 
burglary of the Salt Lake City home of Bill and Joan Coles. At that time, Mr. 
Alvillar was living in the home of Robert Nyman, a cook at the Dodo 
restaurant and called himself "Steve Falconi." (Transcript of Trial, P. 103-04). 
Mr. Alvillar had told Mr. Nyman at least two weeks earlier that he intended to 
sell a classical compact disc collection to get money to pay rent. (Transcript 
of Trial, P.116). 
At trial, Joan Coles testified that she returned from work at about 5:30 
or 5:45 p.m. and found that someone had shattered the glass in French doors 
into her home. (Transcript of Trial, P. 58). The wood framing on the French 
doors was splintered, and the doors were open into the dining room from a 
porch. (Transcript of Trial, P. 59). After calling the police, Ms. Coles 
discovered that most of her compact disc collection of classical music and a 
portable Sony Discman were missing, along with videotapes of the operas "Don 
Giovanni" and "La Traviata," an Olympus camera, a blue travel bag and a 
plastic book bag. (Transcript of Trial, P. 63). According to Ms. Coles, one of 
the stolen compact discs, a recording of lute music from the Italian 
Renaissance, had been given to her by the musician's parents and was very rare. 
(Transcript of Trial, P. 74). 
While waiting for the police to arrive, Ms. Coles called Bill Goldsmith, 
the owner of Discriminator Music, a store that specializes in classical music. 
(Transcript of Trial, P. 76). Ms. Coles told Mr. Goldsmith that her collection 
was missing and alerted him to watch for attempts to sell her compact discs. 
(Transcript of Trial, P. 76-77). On the afternoon of August 3, 1994, Mr. 
Goldsmith called Ms. Coles and told her that someone was attempting to sell 
the compact discs. (Transcript of Trial, P. 77). According to Mr. Goldsmith, 
a man had come into the store with about 60 compact discs to sell. (Transcript 
of Trial, P. 124). Mr. Goldsmith realized that he had sold some of the compact 
discs to Ms. Coles. The rare compact disc of lute music also was included in 
the compact discs brought to Discriminator Music. (Transcript of Trial, P. 
125). 
Ms. Coles called the police and her daughter, Katie Coles, who lived near 
the music store. (Transcript of Trial, P. 76,78). Katie Coles testified that she 
immediately went to Discriminator Music. She saw a man she later identified 
as Mr. Alvillar sitting in a Toyota truck outside the store although it was a very 
hot afternoon. (Transcript of Trial, P. 133). Inside the store, a man later 
identified as Robert Nyman was browsing. According to Katie Coles, she 
looked at Mr. Nyman very closely but he did not appear to be nervous. 
(Transcript of Trial, P. 234-45). 
Officer Robert Reese of the Salt Lake City Police Department testified 
that he contacted Mr. Nyman inside the store and was told that he had 
received the compact discs from the man in his Toyota truck, whom he knew 
as "Steve Falconi." (Transcript of Trial, P. 147). "Steve Falconi" told another 
officer, George Pregman, that he did not know who owned the truck. Officer 
Pregman testified that his behavior was suspicious because he acted like he 
didn't know Mr. Nyman. (Transcript of Trial, P. 140). Inside the store, the 
defendant said he had never seen the compact disc collection before, but then 
disputed Ms. Coles' statement that it was a unique collection. (Transcript of 
Trial, P. 82,135). 
Mr. Alvillar was arrested by Officer Pregman. Officer Reese went with 
Mr. Nyman to search his home and recovered videotapes of "Don Giovanni" 
and "La Traviata," a cassette tape, an Olympus camera, a Sony Discman and 
two bags. (Transcript of Trial, P. 148-49). Mr. Nyman was not arrested 
because he denied knowing that the compact discs had been stolen and he 
seemed calm and relaxed rather than nervous. (Transcript of Trial, P. 114, 
155). Additionally, Mr. Nyman had been at work during the day on August 2, 
when the burglary had occurred. (Transcript of Trial, P. 155). 
Mr. Nyman testified that he finished work at about 4 p.m. on August 2, 
1994 and returned home. Mr. Alvillar was not home, but he called at about 
5 p.m. to ask for a ride from the corner of Ninth East and Second South. 
When Mr. Nyman picked him up, Mr. Alvillar was carrying a large, heavy blue 
bag and took about 100 compact discs from the bag when they returned home. 
(Transcript of Trial, P. 107,108-09). On August 3,1994, Mr. Alvillar asked Mr. 
Nyman to help him sell the compact discs. (Transcript of Trial, P. 110-11). 
They went to the Gray Whale II, another compact disc store, and left about 50 
compact discs to be appraised. At the Gray Whale, Mr. Alvillar went into the 
store but did not say anything. They then went to the Discriminator, where 
Mr. Alvillar said he wanted to stay in truck. (Transcript of Trial, P. 112). 
Detective Lynn Wright testified that Mr. Alvillar gave the name "Steve 
Falconi" when he was interviewed in the jail and said that Mr. Nyman had 
brought the compact discs home from work at about 3 p.m. on August 2. 
(Transcript of Trial, P. 161,162). Mr. Alvillar also said that he was just "along 
for the ride" when the compact discs were taken to the music stores. 
(Transcript of Trial, P.162). 
Mr. Alvillar testified that, in June 1994, he gave a friend $500 to start a 
mail order business and was expecting a return of five times his investment. 
(Transcript of Trial, P. 170-71). In July 1994, Mr. Alvillar learned that the 
money had been lost. His friend promised in mid-July that he would have the 
money by the beginning of August or he would give Mr. Alvillar a compact disc 
collection in lieu of payment. (Transcript of Trial, P. 171). Mr. Alvillar went 
to the friend's apartment at Ninth East and Third South at about 2:30 p.m. on 
August 2,1994 to get the collection. Although his friend asked for more time 
to get the money, Mr. Alvillar's friend gave him a bag containing compact discs, 
a camera and a portable compact disc player. (Transcript of Trial, P. 174-75). 
Mr. Alvillar testified that he believed these items belonged to his friend. 
(Transcript of Trial, P. 176). He said in direct examination that he had used 
the name of "Steve Falconi" because he had been convicted of a felony 13 years 
earlier. (Transcript of Trial, P. 177). He also told jurors that he had 
absconded from a halfway house in June 1994 and was afraid that he would be 
returned to prison as a parole violator if his real name was known. (Transcript 
of Trial, P. 177-78). Mr. Alvillar testified that this fear also explained his 
failure to admit any knowledge of the compact disc collection and his attempt 
to blame Mr. Nyman for the theft. (Transcript of Trial, P. 180-81, 185). 
Mr. Alvillar testified that the friend who had given him the compact discs 
had moved to California and could not be located. (Transcript of Trial, P. 
185). Police compared fingerprints found at the crime scene to those of Mr. 
Alvillar, Mr. Nyman, Bill Coles and Joan Coles. The print from Ms. Coles was 
not sufficient for a comparison, and those of the three men did not match the 
crime scene print. Police did not seek another fingerprint from Ms. Coles. 
(Transcript of Trial, P. 158). 
After deliberating for approximately three hours, jurors returned a 
verdict finding Mr. Alvillar guilty of Burglary and Theft. He was sentenced on 
May 22, 1995 to concurrent terms of 1 to 15 years on the burglary charge and 
0 to 5 years on the theft count. These terms are to be served consecutive to 
the sentence under which Mr. Alvillar had been paroled to the halfway house. 
(Transcript of Sentencing, P.7). Mr. Alvillar's Notice of Appeal was timely 
filed on June 20, 1995. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
There was no legitimate tactical reason for defense counsel to elicit 
testimony that Mr. Alvillar had been convicted of a felony, was on parole and 
had escaped from a halfway house. This information would have been 
inadmissible if the prosecution had been its proponent, and it was extremely 
prejudicial. As a result, Mr. Alvillar received ineffective assistance of counsel 
and his conviction violates the Sixth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution and Article I, § 12 of the Utah Constitution. 
ARGUMENT 
MR. ALVILLARS CONVICTION WAS OBTAINED THROUGH 
THE INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL AND MUST 
BE VACATED. 
The right to counsel is fundamental to a fair trial. E.g., Kimmelman v. 
Morrison. 477 U.S. 365 (1986); Gideon v. Wainwright. 372 U.S. 335 (1963). 
The right to counsel under the Sixth Amendment is essential because it is 
through counsel that other constitutional guarantees are secured. United 
States v. Cronic. 466 U.S. 648 (1984). The accused's lawyer must function as 
an active advocate, rather than as a mere friend of the court. Evitts v. Lucey. 
469 U.S. 387, 394 (1985); Osborn v. Shillinger. 861 F.2d 612 (10th Cir. 1988). 
The Utah and United States constitutions therefore require defense counsel to 
play "the role necessary to ensure that the trial is fair," Strickland v. 
Washington. 466 U.S. 668, 685 (1984), by guaranteeing that "the right to 
counsel is the right to effective assistance of counsel." McMann v. Richardson. 
397 U.S. 759, 771 n.4 (1970) (emphasis added). Accord, e.g., State v. Templin. 
805 P.2d 182 (Utah 1990). 
Under the standard established in Strickland for evaluating an ineffective 
assistance claim, reversal is required if a defendant demonstrates that counsel's 
performance was deficient and that the deficiency prejudiced the defense. The 
"deficient performance" prong of the Strickland test is satisfied by proof that 
counsel's representation "fell below an objective standard of reasonableness," 
based on prevailing professional norms. 466 U.S. at 688; Templin. 805 P.2d 
at 186. The "prejudice" prong of the test is met by demonstrating a "reasonable 
probability that, but for counsel's errors, the result of the proceeding would 
have been different." 466 U.S. at 694. A reasonable probability is one which 
is "sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome," but "a defendant need 
not show that counsel's deficient conduct more likely than not altered the 
outcome in the case."2 466 U.S. at 694, 693; Templin. 805 P.2d at 187; State 
v. Verde. 770 P.2d 116, 119 n. 2 (Utah 1989). 
In applying the Strickland test, the reasonableness of a defense attorney's 
conduct must be evaluated from her perspective at the time of representation, 
and in light of all the circumstances of the case. 466 U.S. at 689-90. The 
burden is on the defendant to overcome a presumption that counsel's 
representation fell within a wide range of reasonable assistance and that the 
proceeding's result was reliable. Further, the right to effective assistance 
focuses on the adversarial process rather than on the rapport between attorney 
and client. Therefore, no weight should be given to "either [a defendant's] 
expression of satisfaction with counsel's performance at the time of his trial, or 
to his later expression of dissatisfaction." Cronic, 466 U.S. at 657 n.21. 
Mr. Alvillar contends that he received ineffective assistance of counsel 
2
 The Strickland test therefore establishes a standard of proof which is lower than 
the "preponderance of the evidence" standard used in civil cases. 
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at the guilt phase of trial without using a bifurcated procedure); State v. James. 
767 P.2d 549 (Utah 1989) (Aggravating circumstances based on prior 
convictions should be handled in a bifurcated procedure by withholding 
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The prior conviction elicited here by defense counsel was not admissible 
under Rule 609. In fact, prior to trial, the district court granted Mr. Alvillar's 
motion in limine under Rule 609 to preclude the prosecution from questioning 
him to establish that the prior offense was a burglary and that he had used a 
different name when arrested. (Transcript of Motions Hearing, 1/30/95). 
Further, it would have been error for the prosecution to introduce the 
testimony defense counsel brought out -- that Mr. Alvillar had been previously 
convicted of a felony, that he was on parole and that he had escaped from a 
halfway house a short time before the Coles' home was burglarized. Cf. State 
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were conflicting stories before the jury. Mr. Alvillar's testimony that he had 
unwittingly received the Coles' property from a friend was believable and there 
is a reasonable likelihood that it would have been accepted by jurors who did 
not know he was a convicted felon and that he was on parole and had escaped 
from a halfway house. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons and authorities, Mr. Alvillar respectfully 
requests this Court to vacate his convictions of Burglary and Theft and remand 
this case for a trial with the assistance of effective counsel. 
JAMES C. BRADSHAW 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
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CERTIFIED COURT REPORTER 
2901 W. Bedford Road 
..w~„ Valley City, Utah 84119 
177 
1 Q I want to talk to you a little bit about when 
2 the police officers were questioning you, you heard them 
3 state several times that you used another name, name of 
4 Steve Falconi? 
5 A Yes. 
6 Q Explain to the jury were why you used the 
7 name Steve Falconi? 
8 A I was arrested about thirteen years ago. I 
9 will be honest, I got convicted of a felony about thirteen 
10 years ago. I was on parole at the time and what happened 
11 was I was actually in a halfway house, and I had absconded 
12 from the halfway house, and that's why I gave them the 
13 facilities name and— 
14 Q Can you explain to the jury what "absconded" 
15 means? 
16 A Excuse me? 
17 Q What "absconded" means. 
18 I A It means I ran from the halfway house. 
19 Q When did that happen? 
20 A It was about the first part of or the end of 
21 June, the end of June. 
22 Q Is that when you met Mr. Nyman? 
23 A Approximately. It was about a week later. 
24 Q You also gave him the name "Steve Falconi." 
25 Can you tell the jury why you told him that your name was 
1 7 fl 
Steve Falcon i? 
A Like I said, vcu kr*i. •> ,. wit from * »•» 
haifwr*- ' i J» •-.:- n ' t w.^-4: a n y n o d y 
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CROSS-EXAMINATION 
BY MR- PARKER: 
184 
1 Q When? 
2 A When I was living with him, I had told him I 
3 was going to be getting property from a friend of mine. 
4 Q I am talking about after you were picked up 
5 and after you had blamed Mr. Nyman for having the property 
6 and bringing it there, you didn't ever call and apologize 
7 to Mr. Nyman for involving him? 
8 A I was told not to contact any of the 
9 witnesses. 
10 Q Let's make this clear, you have never seen 
11 this bag before, according to your statement? 
12 A Not— I didn't recognize the brand name. The 
13 bag looks similar to my Kirkham bag, the Kirkham bag I 
14 had. 
15 Q According to your story, it was your Kirkham 
16 bag you went over, picked up the tapes in. 
17 A Yes. 
18 Q It was not this bag? 
19 A No. 
20 Q No further questions. 
21 REDIRECT EXAMINATION 
22 BY MS. CLARK: 
23 Q Will you tell the jury why you couldn't 
24 continue to tell the same story Mr. Nyman was involved in 
25 this? 
185 
1 A Well, I was just really scared, you know, I 
2 found out that the property was stolen, and I know it was 
3 really wrong for me to blame it on someone else. That's 
4 why I came forward today with the argument that I did have 
5 the property. You know, like I said, I do feel bad about 
6 blaming it on Mr. Nyman in the beginning, but I was just 
7 real scared. I don't want to go back to prison and that's 
8 mainly the reason why. 
9 Q Did you have any reason for not telling them 
10 about your friend? 
11 A Well, I kind of wouldn't want to implicate 
12 anybody else. I have tried to contact him since noon, 
13 he's moved to California. I have been unable to locate 
14 him to basically back up what I am saying, that he did 
15 give me the property. 
16 Q Now, did you at any time on August 2nd go in 
17 the area of 1300 East Third Avenue? 
18 A I did not. 
19 Q Did you at any time attempt to or break into 
20 Mr. and Mrs. Cole's' house? 
21 A No, I didn't. 
22 Q Do you know anyone that did do that? 
23 A Not that I am aware of, no. 
24 Q And at the time prior to approaching the 
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